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Constitutional Paradox: Ethno-federal Consociationalism 
and Refugee Return in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina2
Abstract: In 1995, the peace agreement for the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina became one of the latest examples of consociational 
theory being utilised as a method of conflict management 
governance in deeply divided societies. Drawing from the work 
of Arend Lijphart, the Dayton Peace Accord established the 
institutional design of the future state, which subscribed to the 
notion that inter-ethnic co-operation is most likely to occur within 
an ethno-federal power sharing arrangement. This article examines 
the paradox between the establishment of ethno-federal entities, as 
a consociational requirement of post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and the integral importance of refugee returns to pre-war multi-
ethnic regions, as stated in Annex VII of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP). Rather 
than simply advocating integrative institutional design as an 
alternative solution, the experiences of minority refugee returnees 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina highlight the problematic relationship 
between the everyday predicaments of displaced individuals, and 
the implementation of high political theory. This article argues that 
the reality of refugee returns in Bosnia-Herzegovina has done little 
to challenge the ethno-federalist features of the GFAP, and thus has 
not met the expectations of those aiming to successfully achieve the 
“re-mixing” of ethnic groups.
Keywords: Consociationalism, ethno-federalism, refugee returns, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Accord, conflict management, 
reintegration, post-conflict
In 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina became one of the latest examples of 
consociational theory being utilised as a method of conflict management 
governance in deeply divided societies. The internationally-brokered Dayton 
Peace Agreement (DPA) were signed by the leaders of the conflicted Bosniak, 
Croat and Serb forces, which established the new constitutional design for a 
multi-ethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where all three groups would 
1 E-mail: laura.wise@edu.uni-graz.at.
2 I would like to thank Benedikt Harzl and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable 
comments on this paper.
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be represented equally across all levels of institutional governance. Drawing 
from the scholarly work of Arend Lijphart, the General Framework Agreement 
for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (GFAP) established the institutional 
design of the future state, of which one major consequence was the division 
of the state into two separate entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), which were structured on the basis 
of constituent peoples as power-sharing partners, and predominantly 
homogenous municipalities. However, the same peace agreement also 
prioritised the establishment of a multi-ethnic state, and the swift return to 
their pre-war homes of the approximately 2 million people displaced by the 
conflict,3 in order to counteract the results of widespread ethnic cleansing. 
This was addressed in Annex VII of the GFAP, which stated that,
“[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to 
their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them 
property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 
1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to 
them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important 
objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of such persons 
who have left their territory, including those who have been accorded 
temporary protection by third countries.”4
This article examines the paradox between the establishment of ethno-
federal entities, as a consociational requirement of post-conflict Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and the integral importance of refugee returns to pre-war 
multi-ethnic regions, in a singular case study. Rather than simply advocating 
integrative institutional design as an alternative solution to this constitutional 
paradox, the experiences of minority refugee returnees in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
highlight the problematic relationship between the everyday predicaments 
of displaced individuals, and the implementation of high political theory. 
Drawing from alternative approaches of understanding re-integration, 
this article argues that the reality of refugee returns in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
has done little to challenge the ethno-federalist features of the GFAP, and 
thus has not met the expectations of those aiming to successfully achieve 
3 International Crisis Group, “The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” Europe Report No. 137 (December 2002): 1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/137-the-continuing-challenge-of-refugee-
return-in-bosnia-herzegovina.aspx
4 See Annex VII, Dayton Peace Agreement, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, November 21 1995, accessed January 18 2014, http://www.state.gov/p/
eur/rls/or/dayton/52592.htm.
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the “re-mixing”5 of ethnic groups. This interpretation of the Bosnian case 
raises further questions regarding the reliance on consociational theory for 
managing post-conflict peace settlements, and how the peace and security of 
victims of conflict is addressed through these mediums.
Consociationalism and Ethno-Federalism in Divided Societies
Consociationalism was first developed in the 1960s as a political theory 
by Arend Lijphart, who argued that the most effective way to democratically 
govern a society fragmented by entrenched competing identities or 
segments, such as religious, linguistic, “ethnic” and others,6 was through a 
form of institutionalise power-sharing. Lijphart also argued that “it may be 
desirable to keep transactions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided 
society – or, similarly, among different nationalities in a multinational state 
– to a minimum.”7 This understanding of inter-group interaction shapes the 
institutional design of a democratic non-majoritarian state, structured around 
four key pillars; a grand coalition; a proportional representation electoral 
system; a mutual veto system, and group autonomy.8
It is the group autonomy pillar that this article is concerned with, and 
in particular the use of territorial governance in a federal system. Although 
group autonomy is often mentioned in relation to institutional control over 
public policies such as education or cultural rights, Christopher McCrudden 
and Brendan O’Leary make the distinction that community autonomy in a 
consociation simply means that “each group has a great deal of internal self-
government in at least one public function.”9 This ethno-territorial autonomy 
is more commonly referred to as “ethno-federalism”, which can be defined as a 
“federal political system in which component territorial governance units are 
5 Rebecca Brubaker, “From the unmixing to the remixing of peoples: UNHCR and minority 
returns in Bosnia,” New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Article No. 261 (August 2013). 
http://www.unhcr.org/520a4ccf9.html.
6 Defined by Ian Lustick as a society in which “ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic 
segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high potential salience, sustained 
over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of issues…” and membership is “clear” 
and “unchangeable”. Ian Lustik, “Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism 
Versus Control,” World Politics 31 (1979): 325, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2009992.
7 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 31 (1969): 220–221, doi: http://
dx.doi.org/10.2307/2009820.
8 James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1998), 179.
9 Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, “Introduction,” in Courts and Consociations: 
Human Rights Versus Power-Sharing, eds. Christopher McCrudden and Brendan O’Leary, 
5–7 (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 2013).
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invested with ethnic content”,10 and is clearly visible in the institutional design 
of the GFAP. Although consociationalism was not originally conceptualised 
by Lijphart for application to post-conflict situations,11 nonetheless, variations 
on the institutional embodiment of consociational governance can also be 
found in post-conflict12 peace agreements in Northern Ireland, Belgium, 
Burundi, Macedonia, Iraq, Kenya, Cyprus and Lebanon, with the degree of 
ethno-territorialisation varying from case to case. These cases are the subject 
of a vast number of studies which scrutinise the successes and failures of 
consociational design in each divided society, all of which have implications 
for the future development of the theory. This is especially true when leading 
scholars of consociational approaches also hold advisory roles in supranational 
governance institutions, and when policy makers or legal practitioners use their 
experiences to contribute to scholastic texts discussing approaches of post-
conflict governance. These practices demonstrate the dynamic relationship 
between scholars and practitioners of consociational theory, and thus the 
potential of everyday experiences in consociational systems to influence the 
way in which it is analysed and debated at a theoretical level.
Constitutional Paradox in the Dayton Peace Agreement
Consociationalist theory, the “consociational confederation”13 
components of the GFAP, and the institutional design of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
have all come under academic scrutiny since the DPA was signed, some of 
which has raised concern over the limits of re-integration which such an 
approach offers.14 Whilst consociationalist arrangements are intended to be a 
transitory stage from the cessation of violence to more integrative, post-conflict 
institutional design, one concern regarding the Bosnian case is the use of ethno-
10 Henry Hale, “The Double-Edged Sword of Ethnofederalism: Ukraine and the USSR in 
Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 40 (2008): 294, doi: http://www.jstor.org/
stable/20434083.
11 Rob Aitkin, “Consociational Peace Processes and Ethnicity: The implications of the Dayton 
and Good Friday Agreements for Ethnic Identities and Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Northern Ireland,” in The Challenges of Ethno-Nationalism: Case Studies in Identity Politics, 
ed. Adrian Guelke, 232 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
12 Although peace settlement is used here to describe agreements signed by all parties to a 
conflict, in order to end hostilities, the “post” aspect of the term aims to reflect the fact 
that these agreements can become or contain key constitutional design features of the post-
conflict political system.
13 McCrudden and O’Leary, “Introduction,” 9.
14 See Aitkin, “Consociational Peace Processes and Ethnicity,” 232–253; Joel Selway and Kharis 
Templeman, “The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies,” 
Comparative Political Studies 45 (2012): 1542–1571, doi: 10.1177/0010414011425341, and 
Sumantra Bose, “The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton,” International Peacekeeping 22 
(2005): 327, doi: 10.1080/13533310500074028.
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federal features within a society where homogenisation of territory through 
the mass displacement of civilians was a targeted aim of war. The conflation 
of territory with ethnic identity through violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina has 
been conceptualised as a “house war”, in which “the politics of house and home 
played a central role, instrumentally as well as ideologically, in causing mass 
flight and making irreversible the effects of ethnic cleansing.”15 It is widely 
documented that the conflict between 1992 and 1995 was characterised by 
extreme violence, ethnic cleansing and sexual assault, which was conducted 
in the pursuit or name of ethno-nationalist agendas to divide the former 
Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. One result of this was the displacement of at 
least half the pre-war population, with the displaced divided between the one 
million citizens who fled abroad to neighbouring countries and further afield, 
and one million people remaining internally displaced.16
It is with this challenge to peacemakers that a crucial contradiction 
between territorial ethno-federalism, and the issue of refugee returns can 
be identified within the GFAP. According to the architects of the DPA, its 
goals were both the permanent cessation of violence and “an agreement for 
a multi-ethnic state,”17 and subsequently a defining feature of the DPA was 
the establishment of the two separate entities within the state, which both 
embodied the consociational principles of power-sharing elite cartels, and 
predominantly ethnically-homogenous municipalities. However, concerns 
regarding the legitimation of ethnic boundaries shaped through violence, 
contributed to the necessary inclusion of a stringent refugee returns policy,18 
which established and emphasised the right of all displaced persons to 
return to their pre-war homes. The ensuing contradiction was identified by 
in the immediate post-conflict period by Madelyn D. Shapiro, who argued 
that the “individual choice given to refugees regarding whether to return 
or relocate could, however, destroy the very ethnic separation between the 
Federation and Republika Srpska recognized by the Dayton Accords.”19 This 
paradox is especially evident in the case of minority returns, which although 
not explicitly stated in Annex VII, was deemed a priority for international 
actors such as United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 
15 Anders H. Stefansson, “Home in the Making: Property Restitution, Refugee Return, and 
Senses of Belonging in a Post-war Bosnia Town,” International Migration 44 (2006): 118, 
doi: 0.1111/j.1468-2435.2006.00374.
16 Carl Dahlman and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of 
Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places,” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 95 (2005): 644, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8306.2005.00479.x.
17 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 232.
18 OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995-2005: 10 Years Report (Sarajevo: OSCE 
BiH, 2005), 109.
19 Madelyn D. Shapiro, “The Lack of Implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords: 
Another Palestinian Crisis?,” American University International Law Review 14 (1998): 567.
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Following the creation of ethnically-designated federal entities, returns in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina were categorised as being either majority, where “return 
of individuals to areas in which they make up part of the ethnic majority,” 
or minority, which was “the return of individuals to areas in which they 
constitute an ethnic minority”.20 Thus, by using the demographic distribution 
of 1991 as the benchmark of origin, when most municipalities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were still fairly ethnically heterogeneous, Annex VII aimed not 
only to promote the individual human right to return, but also to reverse the 
ethnic cleansing of territory into homogenous units.21
It is this contradiction between conditions for the success of consociational 
peace agreements, in that it is beneficial for ethnic groups to remain separated 
and homogenous in the immediate post-conflict period, and the real-life 
practise of an individual choosing to return to their home of origin, that this 
article now turns to. The DPA has been described as having a degree of flexibility 
in which the possibilities of institutional change offer a transformative capacity 
for Bosnian society,22 and the remainder of this article traces changes made 
since 1995 which have attempted to shift the constitutional design from one 
of segregation to a more integrated, multi-ethnic state. By doing so, it explores 
how the international actors have attempted to address this contradiction, and 
whether integrative institutional reforms have encouraged successful minority 
returns, thus addressing Shapiro’s original concerns regarding refugee policy 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Observing Institutional Change in Bosnia and Herzegovina
It is possible to isolate some key moments for the development of the 
DPA during the two decades since its implementation, in which fundamental 
changes have been made to the constitutional design that mark a shift away 
from ethno-federalism. The first major move to reduce the degree of ethno-
homogenity in the institutional design was the Constitutional Court decision 
in the “Constituent Peoples” case in 2000, which declared that the DPA only 
provided equal status for all three constituent peoples to participate at the state 
level of governance, but not at the entity level. The judgement required that 
the prelude to the constitution of the RS was changed from one of an ethnic 
Serb territory, to one which reflected the equal right of all individuals to reside 
there and participate in its governance, whilst the Federation was also adjusted 
20 Brubaker, “From the unmixing to the remixing of peoples,” 2.
21 Brubaker discerns this intent, also widely speculated by other scholars, through interviews 
with officials involved in drafting the DPA. Brubaker, “From the unmixing to the remixing 
of peoples,” 2.
22 Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff, “Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: Lessons for 
internationalized state building,” Ethnopolitics 5 (2006): 3, doi: 10.1080/17449050600579559.
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to emphasise the role that Bosnian Serbs had in the political structures of the 
entity. Importantly, the judgement also required that “special attention would 
have to be paid at the sub-entity level to avoid ethnic homogenisation of cantons 
or municipalities”.23 This decision was declared as effectively “de-ethnicizing” 
both federal entities, and paving the way for reintegration, but in practice 
has led to minimal changes in the workings of governance at the entity level. 
Violation of the court’s decision by the Republika Srpska National Assembly in 
2002 demonstrated the strength of opposition to attempts at reducing ethno-
nationalist elite control at any level of governance, and sent a clear signal to 
displaced peoples wishing to return to the RS that such reintegration was not 
welcomed by the entity.
To date, the case has been the only attempt which has resulted in 
considerable institutional re-design away from consociational principles. 
Despite the victory of Dervo Sejdić and Jakob Finci at the European Court 
of Human Rights in 2006,24 regarding the ability of non-constituent peoples 
or “Others” to stand in elections for the ethnically-allocated Presidency, 
this decision continues to be contested by domestic actors, with the Court’s 
ruling yet to be implemented. There is also a long history of failed attempts 
to come to meaningful agreements at internationally brokered talks, such as 
the unsuccessful “Butmir Process” in 2009, whilst institutional engineering at 
the local level has produced mixed results, and tended to be less successful at 
producing multi-ethnic governance units in municipalities with high degrees 
of complex consociationalism and territorial division.25 The lack of genuine 
institutional change from ethno-federalist governance structures to those 
which encourage re-integration and multi-ethnicity, should not necessarily be 
interpreted as a failure of an integrationist approach. Rather, it is an indication 
of how consociational design makes it possible in practice for elites to use 
ethno-territorial governance to protect their individual power, and that they 
will resist both constitutional and diplomatic attempts to reduce this.
23 Jens Woelk, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Trying to Build a Federal State on Paradoxes,” in 
Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems: sub-national perspectives, eds. Michael Burgess 
and Alan Tarr, 130 (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2012).
24 For details of the case see Council of Europe Office in Belgrade, “Sedic and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” accessed January 10 2014, http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_
eng/?conid=1545.
25 Florian Bieber, “Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brčko,” 
International Peacekeeping 12 (2005): 420–433, doi: 10.1080/13533310500074523.
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 Facilitating Minority Returns
The process of minority returns and the implementation of Annex VII has 
received a mixed response, with the current analysis from UNHCR claiming 
that of the 1,030,392 displaced individuals who have returned to locations 
within Bosnia and Herzegovina, 470,835 returned to their place of origin in 
which they constitute a national minority.26 The majority of these returns were 
recorded in the first three years following the signing of the DPA, but there 
was a marked surge in the rate of return in 2002 and 2003. This is attributed 
to the “accelerated and effective implementation of property laws, which 
resulted in the restitution of housing units to their pre-war owners… thus 
creating conditions for a significant number of refugees and displaced persons 
to return to their homes.”27 The Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) 
was part of a revised strategy by the international community, concerned that 
the slowing rate of returns would hinder the achievement of the “early returns 
priority” aspect of Annex VII, and fail to address their concerns regarding the 
legitimation of ethnically cleansed territories by the DPA. The implementation 
of legislation to increase the rate of minority returns can be viewed as a 
form of institutional engineering to make the state more integrative through 
legislation.
Although the link between the PLIP and the surge in minority refugee 
returns is cited by officials as an indication that re-integration, and thus 
heterogeneous municipalities, are being achieved, this requires further 
investigation. Reintegration can be observed when municipalities as political 
units have become heterogeneous once again, and there has been a restoration of 
inter-ethnic relations and participation throughout institutions of governance. 
However, for UNHCR, the organisation charged with the process of refugee 
returns, reintegration means the “universal enjoyment of full political, civil, 
economic, social and cultural rights.”28 This broad definition has been broken 
down into a conceptual framework by Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, for 
whom the ability of refugees to integrate is founded on rights and citizenship, 
before expanding to basic facilitators of language and safety, social bonds and 
connections, and finally, employment, housing, education, and health.29 There 
26 UNHCR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Statistics Package, December 31 2012, accessed 
February 10 2014, http://unhcr.ba/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/SP_12_2012.pdf. The 
statistics package for 2013 has yet to be published at the time of writing.
27 Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Revised Core Document 
Forming Part of States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sarajevo: 2010), 11, accessed February 
10 2014, http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/LjudskaPrava/common%20core%20document%20
BH-rev-ENGLISH.pdf.
28 UNHCR, Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities (Geneva: UNHCR, 2004), 5.
29 Alastair Ager and Alison Strang, “Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework,” 
Journal of Refugee Studies 21 (2008): 166–190, doi: 10.1093/jrs/fen016.
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are visible overlaps between these definitions, and it can be argued that in 
order to achieve multi-ethnic political units, the facilitation of the components 
in Ager and Strang’s framework is crucial.
Reintegration in Practice
An important point to make when establishing the extent of minority 
returns and reintegration in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that the official 
minority return figures are acknowledged to not be completely accurate. 
According to the International Crisis Group, “large numbers of returnees 
reportedly fail to register with local municipal or cantonal authorities because 
they want to maintain their pensions or health benefits in the places from 
which they have returned, because they have gone home only provisionally 
or part-time, or because they do not trust the local authorities.”30 The 
lack of a complete data set due to unregistered return is more than just a 
methodological issue, as it also shows an unwillingness by minority returnees 
to integrate through participation in local political institutions for a variety of 
economic and security related reasons. Although this means that the number 
of physical returns could be higher than recorded, the lack of participation fails 
to change the ethnic composition of governance at the municipal level, and 
challenges the hope that an increase in minority return rates would increase 
the heterogeneity of political institutions at multiple levels of governance.
The reasons attributed by the ICG for failure to register as a returnee all 
fall into various requirements of integration as proposed by Ager and Strang’s 
framework. Regarding safety, despite a vast improvement in the security 
situation from the immediate period after the war, returnees are still vulnerable 
to targeted violent crime and intimidation from local ethno-nationalists.31 
Even if the threat of violent intimidation is low, in many locations “returnees 
are reminded of their second class status as “minority returnees” and not as 
ordinary pre-war residents of their own home towns.”32 Additionally, there 
are some cases of wartime ethno-nationalist actors retaining positions in 
local authorities, 33 which does not signal to displaced individuals that their 
safety will not be compromised, and thus discourages sustainable return. This 
30 International Crisis Group, “The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Returns in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” 4.
31 Ibid., 8.
32 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John O’Loughlin, “After Ethnic Cleansing: Return Outcomes 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina a Decade Beyond War,” Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 99 (2009): 1052, doi: 10.1080/00045600903260671.
33 Brubaker, “From the unmixing to the remixing of peoples: UNHCR and minority returns 
in Bosnia,” 4.
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particular factor demonstrates how the refugee return process is interlinked 
with wider problems in the post-conflict state, in this case, the issue of 
accountability and retributive justice.
Attempts to encourage return through another aspect of the framework, 
housing, has already been mentioned, namely with the PLIP. In the case of 
property restitution, the initiative was highly successful, as it is estimated that 
over 99% of the cases were completed by 2006, and had enabled the owners 
of over 197, 815 properties to be granted restitution.34 However, although the 
legislation is deemed to have facilitated minority returns which may otherwise 
could not have happened, property repossession has also been conducted 
in order to sell or exchange for new life in majority areas or abroad, and 
therefore has, in some cases, made it more advantageous for displaced persons 
not to return to their places of origin.35 Therefore, although the PLIP can be 
understood as an important institutional implementation for the provision of 
human rights, and of refugee choice,36 it has struggled to lead to sustainable 
minority returns that it was hoped the legislation would achieve.37
The practice of partial return is another rationale for not registering as 
returnee, and it can be understood as a failure to achieve integration in several 
spheres of Ager and Strang’s framework, such as employment and health. 
Despite material incentives in the housing sphere such as the PLIP, some 
displaced persons, particularly those who received refugee status and support 
abroad, see partial return as more beneficial, as they can continue to receive 
financial benefits from their host country. Meanwhile, refugees who commit 
to full, permanent return and renounce their claim to rights within their host-
country face limited access to benefits, healthcare, and support from local 
authorities within the Bosnian state, which is economically crippled by the 
effects of slow post-conflict reconstruction and mass privatisation of a formerly 
socialist system.38 The precariousness of the economic situation in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has also led to an intergenerational partition of return, with 
younger IDPs staying “in their place of displacement seeking education, social 
34 Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Revised Core Document 
Forming Part of States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina, 11.
35 Patricia Weiss Fagen, “Refugees and IDPs after Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home,” 
United States Institute of Peace Special Report, No. 268 (April 2011): 5, http://www.usip.org/
sites/default/files/SR268Fagen.pdf.
36 Rhodri C. Williams, “Post-Conflict Property Restitution and Refugee Return in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: Implications for International Standard-Setting and Practice,” New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 37 (2004–2005): 441–551.
37 Huma Haider, “The Politicisation of Humanitarian Assistance: Refugee and IDP Policy 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, April 26, 2010, 
http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/700.
38 Laura Huttenen, “Sedentary Policies and Transnational Relations: A ‘Non-sustainable’ Case 
of Return to Bosnia,” Journal of Refugee Studies 23 (2010): 41–61, doi: 10.1093/jrs/feq002.
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and economic opportunities that are scarcer in their communities of origin.”39 
Partial return can also describe the occurrence of minority returnee enclaves, 
whereby individuals return in large numbers to their pre-war municipalities, 
and yet occupy accommodation in areas where they are among other members 
of their ethnic group, thus contributing to heterogeneous political units but 
remaining geographically separate at the local level. Minority enclaves also 
can be non-spacial, as some returnees occupy their pre-war housing and 
contribute demographically to heterogeneous communities, but rarely venture 
into central public spaces, which are now interpreted as under ethno-federal 
control, and conduct their everyday business through parallel minority 
structures.40
These empirical examples of the realities and complexities of refugee 
return, and the lack of integration that has been achieved according to the 
conceptual framework, demonstrates that the ethno-federalism of the GFAP 
has hardly been reduced or rectified by the process of minority refugee returns. 
It also questions the abilities of consociational agreements to transition from 
the immediate conditions required for ending violence, and the eventual 
establishment of a multi-ethnic state. When examining lived experiences 
which result from normative institutional engineering, several observations 
emerge, regarding the paradoxes that international actors have faced when 
attempting to reverse ethnic cleansing through the minority returns process.
Whilst institutional engineering may have facilitated genuine and 
sustainable return for some individuals, prioritising the redress of restrictions 
present during the DPA negotiations over alternative options for displaced 
persons may have also been detrimental to other human rights of refugees. 
Normative support for the right to return to one’s home of origin is a positive 
legal development that has emerged from the Bosnian experience, but pursuing 
that option over more beneficial or suitable choices for the displaced, such 
as policies to support local integration in the place of refuge, or resettlement 
in a third country, is ethically problematic, and has resulted in unsustainable 
returns.41 Additionally, the fervent pursuit of a dominant policy option for 
a normative goal raises concerns over the right of refugees to choose their 
preferred solution.42
39 UNHCR, quoted in Ó Tuathail and O’Loughlin, “After Ethnic Cleansing: Return Outcomes 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina A Decade Beyond War,” 13.
40 Stefansson, “Home in the Making: Property Restitution, Refugee Return, and Senses of 
Belonging in a Post-war Bosnia Town,” 116–137.
41 Brubaker, “From the unmixing to the remixing of peoples: UNHCR and minority returns 
in Bosnia,” 18.
42 Haider, “The Politicisation of Humanitarian Assistance: Refugee and IDP Policy in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina”.
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This prioritisation of minority return as one of the most important 
ways to address the relationship between ethno-federalism and ethnic-
cleansing in the DPA demonstrates institutional changes designed to facilitate 
reintegration can underestimate the complexity of the act of returning. Despite 
the implementation of the “Revised Strategy of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
the Implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement”43 in 2010, 
many displaced persons still “believed return would actually increase their 
overall precariousness…if not for them, then at least for the next generation”.44 
The examples of failure to achieve durable integration in many of the sectors 
featured in this study highlight the complexities of refugee return, and support 
the assertion that a gap remains between the peace accord process, and the 
facilitation of post-conflict integration at an individual level.
Conclusion
This article has explored the use of consociational ethno-federalism as a 
form of conflict management, and highlights the institutional conflict which 
emerges when ethno-federal territories are the legacy of ethnic cleansing. 
It has used the process of post-conflict minority refugee return to question 
the integrative engineering of political institutions used to counteract this 
constitutional dilemma, through the encouragement of heterogeneous 
demographic processes. The conclusion it draws is that although ethno-
federalist consociationalist theory can provide tangible results in the 
immediate post-conflict period, challenges remain for the later transform 
society from one with deep divisions, to a multi-ethnic civic society.
Additionally, the case study analysis highlights important conflicts which 
exist in the DPA, as an example of a consociational ethno-federal arrangement. 
The first is that ethno-federal arrangements and the right to return to one’s 
home of origin are incompatible in the case the Bosnian house war. Despite 
the number of registered returns, which are lauded as a success, the validity of 
these statistics cannot be taken at face value, and requires detailed examination 
of the sustainability and quality of these returns. The lack of widespread 
minority returns means that there has been a failure to reverse the results of 
ethnic cleansing and return to the demographic distribution of 1991. Thus 
institutions remain marginally affected by local democratic processes, as the 
participation of minority returnees in the political institutions of their place 
43 Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Revised Strategy 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement” (2010), accessed February 20 2014, http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/Izbjeglice/
Revidirano%20strategija%20Engleski.pdf.
44 Stef Jansen, “The Privatisation of Home and Hope: Return, Reforms and the Foreign 
Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Dialectical Anthropology 30 (2006): 192, doi: 10.1007/
s10624-007-9005-x.
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of origin remain minimal. Another conflict that the DPA struggles with is that 
the right to, and process of, return does not necessarily result in reintegration. 
Annex VII has been enacted and interpreted by thousands of displaced 
persons in a variety of ways, but few of these have been in the manner of which 
it was envisioned.
This conclusion highlights a critical juncture in the study of 
consociationalism, ethno-federalism, and integration as practised approaches 
to conflict management, which is where this leaves approaches to refugee 
returns and post-conflict governance. In the Bosnian case, the current number 
of returns is unlikely to dramatically change due to the length of time that 
has passed, as those who chose to integrate in their locations of refuge rather 
than return to their place of origin have established new lives and structures 
which they are unlikely to abandon in exchange for the physical, social, and 
economic insecurity of returning. However, there are still important questions 
to ask regarding the future of those who remain permanently displaced in 
IDP centres, especially as time passes and the attention on resolving refugee 
issues becomes less of a priority for governments and international actors. 
The civic unrest across Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 2014 sparked critical 
conversations about the nature and structure of the post-Dayton state, and 
focused on many of the issues discussed in this article, namely the economic 
condition of the country and the precarious situation that many Bosnians, 
both sedentary and displaced face. Although the energy of the protests has 
since waned, this was a surprise challenge to the consociational ethno-federal 
model utilised in the DPA, which could have consequences for the way the 
Bosnian state is structured. In the meantime, scholars of high institutional 
theory and policymakers should examine the realities of the refugee 
experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a challenge to the belief that the re-
integrations of displaced persons can effectively reverse boundaries settled in 
peace agreements.
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Резиме
Лора Вајз
Уставни парадокс: етно-федерални консоцијанизам 
и повратак избеглица у постдејтонској Босни и 
Херцеговини
Кључне речи: консоцијанизам, етно-федерализам, повратак избеглица, 
Босна и Херцеговина, Дејтонски мировни споразум, управљање 
сукобима, реинтеграција, пост-конфликт
Мировни споразум којим је окончан сукоб у Босни и Херцеговини је 
1995. године постао један од најновијих примера употребе консоцијацијске 
теорије као метода управљања сукобима у дубоко подељеним 
друштвима. Ослањајући се на рад Аренда Лајпхарта, Дејтонски мировни 
споразум установио је уставни дизајн будуће државе, заснован на 
идеји да је међуетничка сарадња највероватнија унутар етно-федералног 
договора о дељењу моћи. Овај текст испитује парадокс између 
установљења етно-федералних интитета, као консоцијацијског захтева 
постконфликтне Босне и Херцеговине, и суштинске важности повратка 
избеглица у области које су биле мултиетничке пре рата, о чему се 
говори у седмом анексу Општег оквирног споразума за мир у Босни и 
Херцеговини. Уместо пуког заступања интегративног институционалног 
дизајна као алтернативног решења, искуства мањинских повратника 
у Босни и Херцеговини наглашавају проблематичну везу између 
свакодневних ситуација у којима се налазе расељена лица и примене 
високопарне политичке теорије. У овом се тексту тврди да је стварност 
повратка избеглица у Босну и Херцеговину мало тога учинила како 
би оспорила етно-федералистичке карактеристике Општег оквирног 
споразума, те да зато није испунила очекивања оних који настоје да 
успешно остваре поновно мешање етничких група.
Рад је примљен 18. новембра 2014, измењен 24. децембра 2014 и прихваћен за 
објављивање 25. децембра 2014. године.

